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Abstract 
In three studies we examine the link between types of national identity and support for leaving 
the European Union (EU). We found that national collective narcissism (but not national 
identification without the narcissistic component) was positively associated with a willingness 
to vote Leave, over and above the effect of political orientation. This pattern was observed in 
a representative Polish sample (Study 1, n = 635), as well as in samples of Polish youth 
(Study 2, n = 219), and professionals employed in the field of international relations (Study 
3), both Polish (n = 73) and British (n = 60). In Studies 2 and 3 this effect was mediated by 
biased EU membership perceptions. The role of defensive versus secure forms of in-group 
identification in shaping support for EU membership is discussed.   
Keywords: national identification, collective narcissism, Polexit, Brexit 
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Brexit and Polexit: Collective narcissism is associated with the support for leaving the 
European Union 
After 40 years of gradual expansion, the European Union (EU) is becoming smaller 
for the first time. As a result of the 2016 referendum, in which almost 52% of those British 
citizens who participated voted Leave, the United Kingdom is now in the process of leaving 
EU. Although officially the UK remains the only member state to ever negotiate its EU exit, 
its decision has started a widespread discussion on membership conditions among other 
member states. Despite the economic, military, and political advantages, the societal 
dissatisfaction with membership of international organizations rises (e.g. McAuley, 2016; 
McCarty, 2017). How can we understand these centrifugal tendencies which may eventually 
transform the world as we know it?  
Commentators pointed to the key role of identity in explaining why people supported 
the UK leaving the EU (e.g., Goodwin, 2016). Social identity processes seem to play an 
increasingly important role in today's political and social landscape. Beyond Brexit, the 
referenda in Catalonia and Scotland, or the rise of nationalist parties, suggest that the 
effectiveness of international organizations is questioned, while the need to emphasize the 
value of the one’s own nation is growing. Tackling this question from a social psychological 
standpoint, we suggest that the attitude toward the EU among the citizens of member states 
would depend on the way they identify with their own nation.  
Past work has shown that in-group identification is not a unidimensional concept, but 
rather that it covers multiple components (Cameron, 2004; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; 
Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). In particular, substantial literature highlighted the psychological 
and social differences between secure and defensive forms of in-group identification across a 
wide range of groups based on different criteria:  ethnic, national, gender and organizational 
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(Amiot & Aubin, 2013; Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013; Kosterman & 
Feshbach, 1989; Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2004; Schatz, Staub, & Lavine, 1999; Sekerdej & 
Roccas, 2016). Classic and contemporary works differentiated between various instances of 
defensive and constructive in-group identification such as pseudo-patriotism and genuine 
patriotism (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), blind vs. constructive 
patriotism (Schatz et al., 1999), nationalism vs. patriotism (Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989), in-
group glorification vs. constructive in-group identification (Roccas et al., 2004; Sekerdej & 
Roccas, 2016) or collective narcissism vs. secure in-group identification (Golec de Zavala, 
Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013). The defensive forms of in-group identification share a common 
core and tend to correlate positively (Cichocka, Marchlewska, Golec de Zavala, & 
Olechowski, 2016; Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Iskra-Golec, 2013; Golec de Zavala, Peker, 
Guerra, & Baran, 2016; Lyons, Kenworthy, & Popan, 2010). This common core stems from 
grandiose in-group image and vigilance to potential threats to the in-group resulting in 
heightened sensitivity to external evaluations of the in-group and more negative inter-group 
attitudes.  
One particular instance of defensiveness which is applicable to diverse group contexts 
is collective narcissism: an attitudinal orientation capturing individuals’ beliefs in the in-group 
greatness requiring external validation (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, Eidelson, & 
Jayawickreme, 2009). Collective narcissists believe that their group is unique, superior and 
deserving, thereby feeling entitled to special recognition and treatment from other groups. 
Individuals high in collective narcissism are sensitive to out-group criticism, to any signs of 
lack of respect, and prone to react to them in a hostile manner (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & 
Iskra-Golec, 2013). Thus, collective narcissism is a robust predictor of negative attitudes 
towards out-groups (see Cichocka, 2016 for a review). It also fosters intergroup perceptions of 
threat and convictions that other groups aim to harm the in-group. These effects are usually 
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observed over and above the effects of other variables typically associated with intergroup 
outcomes, such as social dominance orientation or right-wing authoritarianism (Golec de 
Zavala et al., 2009; Cichocka, Dhont, & Makwana, 2017), and also over and above 
conventional in-group identification (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013).  
In fact, in-group identification without the narcissistic component tends to have 
different consequences than collective narcissism. Both collective narcissism and in-group 
identification assume a positive evaluation of the in-group and, thus, are positively correlated. 
The relationships between collective defensiveness and secure in-group identification can be 
better understood in reference to personal-level processes (Cichocka, 2016; Golec de Zavala, 
Cichocka, Eidelson, & Jayawickreme, 2009). Narcissism and self-esteem also tend to 
positively correlate, although they are underlain by different processes (Marchlewska, 
Castellanos, Lewczuk, Kofta, & Cichocka, 2018; Marchlewska & Cichocka, 2017; Paulhus, 
Robins, Trzesniewski, & Tracy, 2004). While personal defensiveness operationalized as 
individual narcissism is aimed to protect the self against external threats and thus it is linked 
to enhanced vigilance, secure self-esteem (that is self-esteem once the variance shared with 
individual narcissism is co-varied out) implies openness to criticism and readiness to disclose 
negative aspects of the self which are combined with relatively low need to be liked and 
recognized by others (Kernis, 2003). In a similar vein, secure in-group identification reflects 
the successful management of personal needs (e.g, the need for personal control, which is 
usually referred to as the ability to influence the course of one’s own life; Kay, Whitson, 
Gaucher, & Galinsky, 2009), while collective narcissism is a response to frustrated personal 
needs (Adorno, 1963), e.g. low personal control (see Cichocka et al., 2018) or generally low 
feelings of self-worth (Golec de Zavala et al., 2019). Thus, secure in-group identification is a 
positive attachment to the in-group characterized by relative absence of defensiveness that is 
by being independent of external recognition and resilient to potential in-group threats and 
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criticism. Using typical measures of in-group identification, we can estimate the effects of 
secure in-group identification, once we co-vary out the shared variance of collective 
narcissism and in-group identification. Research demonstrates that while collective narcissism 
is related to out-group hostility (Cai & Gries, 2013; Golec de Zavala & Cichocka, 2012), in-
group identification without the narcissistic component predicts out-group tolerance 
(Cichocka et al., 2018; Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013; Marchlewska, 
Cichocka, Jaworska, Golec de Zavala & Bilewicz, 2019).  
Biased perception of intergroup relations 
Collective narcissists have an inflated sense of in-group greatness and are strongly 
convinced that others do not appreciate their in-group enough (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). 
This might explain their low attachment to the wider international community. Indeed, past 
work indicated that British collective narcissism was associated with support for Brexit (e.g., 
(Golec de Zavala, Guerra, & Simão, 2017; Marchlewska, Cichocka, Panayiotou, Castellanos, 
& Batayneh, 2018). Extending this work, we aim to test whether it might apply beyond the 
context of Brexit. Drawing on this work, we hypothesize that readiness to leave supranational 
organization such as European Union should be positively predicted by national collective 
narcissism, but not in-group identification. Crucially, we differentiate between secure and 
defensive form of in-group identification and hypothesize that only the latter is associated 
with biased perceptions of membership benefits, and thereby with stronger support for leaving 
the EU. 
In the current research, we hypothesize that collective narcissism serves as an 
accessible group-based ego-enhancement strategy. We predict that as such, it would bias 
perception of current political events in the direction that would help manage individual 
needs. We go beyond the context of Brexit, and aim to test the mechanism behind the 
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association of national collective narcissism and support for leaving the EU. We chose the 
Polish context because Poland as a country has objectively gained a lot by having been a EU 
member for the last 15 years as evidenced by governmental reports (Cieślak-Wróblewska, 
2019). Despite those economic gains, dissatisfaction with EU is currently being voiced out in 
Poland, as manifested by the rise of Polexit political party or calls to “verify” Poland’s 
membership by ruling Law and Justice party. In 2017 when we started this research 63% of 
Polish citizens were satisfied with membership, while 16% were dissatisfied (Jędras, 2017). 
We predict that despite the objective benefits, those high in collective narcissism are reluctant 
to admit that Poland owes its prosperity to the European Union. We expect that they will 
rather tend to perceive the EU membership as resulting in losses, what fits the central motive 
of in-group’s superiority and unappreciated greatness. In turn, this biased perception results in 
support for weakening ties with other European countries.  
Overview of the studies 
We tested our hypotheses in a series of three studies examining the associations 
between national collective narcissism versus national identification and Brexit and Polexit 
attitudes. Study 1 used a representative sample of Polish adults (N = 635). Study 2 was 
conducted among 219 Polish students. Study 3 was conducted among employees and 
associates of the British Embassy in Poland (60 British, 73 Polish). In all studies, national 
collective narcissism and national identification were measured as predictors of voting in the 
presumed Brexit and Polexit referenda. In Studies 2 and 3, biased perception of EU 
membership (i.e., seeing more costs than benefits) was measured as a mediator of the effect of 
national collective narcissism on voting. As political ideology may be predictive of support 
for policies leading to further European integration versus disintegration and past work found 
that right-wing political attitudes were associated with national collective narcissism 
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Participants and procedure. In Study 1 we recruited a sample representative for 
Polish internet users.  With the help of the Ariadna Research Panel (Ogólnopolski Panel 
Badawczy Ariadna, 2019) we recruited 635 participants, 333 women and 302 men, aged 
between 18 and 79 (M=43.22; SD=15.12).  We measured national collective narcissism and 
national identification as predictors of voting in the presumed Polexit referendum1. The order 
of predictors was counterbalanced. We also measured basic demographics and participants’ 
political orientation. 
Measures. 
Collective narcissism was measured with the short 5-item version of Collective 
Narcissism Scale (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009), participants indicated to what extent they 
agreed with the statements (e.g. “I will never be satisfied until Poles gets all they deserve”, “It 
really makes me angry when others criticize Poles”, “If Poles had a major say in the world, 
the world would be a much better place”) on scales from 1 (definitely not) to 7 (definitely 
yes), α=.92, M=4.45, SD=1.45. 
National identification was measured with 5 items of Social Identification Scale 
(Cameron, 2004), participants responded to items (e.g. “I have a lot in common with other 
                                                          
1 Beside the variables reported here, Study 1 also involved measures of support for 
environmental policies included for the purpose of a different project employing the same 
predictors (Cislak, Wojcik, & Cichocka, 2018; please contact the first author for details). 
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Poles”, “I feel strong ties to other Polish people”, “In general, I’m glad to be Polish”) on 
scales from 1 (definitely not) to 7 (definitely yes), α=.88, M=5.25, SD=1.26. 
Voting preference in a Polexit referendum was measured with a single item: “If you 
could vote in an EU referendum today, how would you be inclined to vote?”, with 528 
participants indicating that Poland should remain in the EU (coded as 0), and 107 indicating 
that Poland should leave the EU (coded as 1). 
Political orientation was a single-item measure, with a scale from 1= definitely left-
wing to 7= definitely right-wing, M=4.11, SD=1.19.  
Results 
Zero-order correlations. We first computed correlations between continuous 
variables. National collective narcissism and national identification were significantly 




Voting preference in Polexit referendum. We then examined the hierarchical 
logistic regression model to verify the relationship between two forms of national 
identification and voting preference in a referendum regarding Poland’s possible exit from the 
EU. As presented in Table 2, political orientation significantly positively predicted the vote 
with right-wingers being more prone to vote Leave. While gender was unrelated to voting, 
age was a significant predictor of the vote, with young people being more prone to vote 
Leave. Importantly, when the overlap between collective narcissism and national 
identification was adjusted for in Step 2, national identification predicted voting Leave 
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Study 1 confirmed that national collective narcissism and national identification were 
positively correlated, yet associated with the tendency to vote Leave in opposite ways. Past 
work showed that the level of national collective narcissism was associated with Brexit 
attitudes. This study extended previous findings by studying different national context of a 
country, which has not officially communicated its intention to leave the European Union. 
Further, we showed the opposite effects of defensive and secure national identification on 
tendency to vote Leave. This allows for more nuanced understanding of the differences in 
policies supported by individuals declaring equally strong attachment to their nation 
(Marchlewska et al., 2018). Furthermore, these effects were demonstrated over and above the 
effects of left-right political orientation.  
Study 2 
In Study 2 we aimed to replicate these findings and to test the potential social-
psychological mechanisms behind these effects. To this end, we replicated the design of Study 
1 and tested the biased perception of membership benefits as a mediator of the effect of the 
national collective narcissism on tendency to vote Leave.  
Method 
Participants and procedure. Following the recommendations of Vazire (2015), we 
aimed for a sample size that would provide 80% power to detect the effect of r of .21—a 
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typical effect in social/personality psychology (Richard, Bond Jr., & Stokes-Zoota, 2003). 
Using GPower, we estimated the target sample size to be at least 173 or larger. In Study 2 we 
recruited 219 Polish young adults, 167 women and 50 men (2 persons declined to indicate 
their gender), aged between 19 and 24 (M = 20.30; SD = .82).  
Measures. 
Collective narcissism was measured with 9 items of the Collective Narcissism Scale 
(Golec de Zavala et al., 2009), α=.80, M=4.22, SD=.90. 
National identification was measured with the 12-item Social Identification Scale 
(Cameron, 2004), α=.91, M=4.92, SD=1.00. 
Biased membership perception was measured with eight items capturing viewing EU 
membership as having more costs that benefits, for example “Overall, EU membership 
brought Poland more losses than gains”, “The EU benefits significantly more from Poland 
being a member than vice versa.”, ”Poland outside the EU will have a stronger economy and 
military power” or “As part of the EU, Poland has a greater voice in international affairs” 
(reversed item). Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree with those 
items on a scale from 1= definitely no to 7= definitely yes. Participants’ responses to those 
items showed a high internal consistency, thus they were averaged to create a single measure 
of biased EU membership perception, α=.84, M=3.37, SD=1.06. 
Voting preference in Polexit referendum was measured in the same way as in Study 
1, with 183 participants indicating that Poland should remain in the EU (coded as 0), 29 
indicating that Poland should leave the EU (coded as 1), and 7 participants declining to 
answer. 
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Political orientation was also measured in the same way as in Study 1, M =4.37, SD 
=1.13. 
Results 
Zero-order correlations. Similarly as in Study 1, national collective narcissism and 
national identification were significantly positively correlated to each other and to political 
orientation, though the relationship between national collective narcissism and political 
orientation was only marginally significant. All of these variables were significantly 




Biased membership perception. We then examined predictors of the biased 
perception of Poland’s membership benefits in a hierarchical regression model. As presented 
in Table 4, political orientation entered in Step 1 was a significant predictor of biased 
membership perceptions meaning that right-wingers perceived more costs than benefits of 
being part of the EU. Age was unrelated to this variable, while gender was related 
significantly negatively indicating that men were more prone to perceive more costs than 
benefits.  
Crucially, when the overlap between collective narcissism and national identification 
was adjusted for in Step 2, the relationship between national identification and biased 
membership perception was significant and negative. In contrast, the relationship between 
collective narcissism and biased membership perception was significant and positive.  
----------------------- 
Table 4 
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---------------------- 
Voting preference in Polexit referendum. To verify the relationship between two 
forms of national identification and voting preference in referendum regarding Poland’s 
leaving the EU, we examined the hierarchical logistic regression model. As presented in Table 
5, when the overlap between collective narcissism and national identification was adjusted 
for, national identification predicted voting to leaving the EU significantly and negatively, 




Mediation model. Finally, we examined the mediation model presented in Figure 1 
using Hayes’s (2012) PROCESS macro with a bootstrapping procedure (with 10,000 
resamples) in which biased perception of membership benefits mediated the association 
between collective narcissism and voting to leaving the EU, Cox & Snell R2 = .34; p < .001; 
Nagelkerke R2 = .62; p < .001. Biased membership perception was a significant mediator of 
the effect of collective narcissism on voting preferences as evidenced by a significant indirect 





Study 2 showed that although national collective narcissism and national identification 
were positively correlated, they were related to the tendency to vote Leave in opposite ways, 
thereby replicating the results of Study 1. Again, these effects were demonstrated over and 
above the effects of left-right political orientation. Extending the results of previous study, we 
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found that the positive effect of national collective narcissism on readiness to vote Leave was 
mediated by biased membership perception. Individuals higher in national collective 
narcissism were more prone to perceive that Poland costs are greater than Poland’s benefits. 
As they perceived Poland would be better off outside of European community than inside it, 
they were more ready to vote Leave. 
Study 3 
In Study 3 we aimed to test whether support for such a political decision is driven by 
similar social-psychological mechanisms across different national context. To this end, we 
aimed to replicate the design of Study 2 and recruit comparable samples from Poland and the 
United Kingdom (UK). UK citizens have already participated in the Brexit referendum, and as 
a result the UK has initiated the leaving procedure.  The reason that stands behind selecting 
UK citizens as a comparison group is the fact that a referendum concerning EU membership 
has already taken place in the UK. If we observed a similar pattern, it would make a stronger 
argument to consider national identification as crucial factor in shaping citizens’ readiness to 
leave supranational organizations. 
Method 
Participants and procedure. The study was an online survey distributed among UK 
and Polish employees and associates of the various departments and / or sections operating 
within the British Embassy in Poland, e.g. Visas & Immigration Section, Political Section, 
Consular Section, Department for International Trade, etc. in their native languages (British 
English and Polish respectively). Respondents who participated in the study potentially 
represented all offices, grades, and positions as the questionnaire was sent out across the 
Embassy and filled in anonymously by both Polish and British employees. Nevertheless, it 
should be noted that respondents’ nationality was not clearly aligned with their higher or 
lower rank or position. For instance, a local (Polish) administrative employee from one 
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department could have a higher level of education (or even a job position) than a British 
administrative employee holding diplomatic status from another department (who, in this 
case, would perform a lower graded job). In most cases though, higher positions were filled 
by British nationals, although it was not necessarily corresponding with better education. 
Local employees, by contrast, had university education in most cases as for them it was 
typically an obligatory job requirement. We aimed to recruit as many of them as we would be 
able to within the two weeks preceding elections in the UK in 2017. The final sample 
consisted of 73 Polish and 60 UK participants. Thirty four Polish participants were women, 
36 were men (3 persons declined to indicate their gender), they were aged between 20 and 64 
(M = 29.74; SD = 9.20). Twenty six UK participants were women, 33 were men (1 person 
declined to indicated gender), they were aged between 20 and 66 (M = 38.66; SD = 11.06). 
Measures. Polish collective narcissism (α=.90, M=4.07, SD=1.22), Polish national 
identification (α=.92, M=4.84, SD = 1.04), biased membership perceptions (α=.87, M=3.22, 
SD=1.23), voting preference in referendum regarding Poland’s leave (61 participants for 
remaining in the EU coded as 0, 11 for leaving EU coded as 1, 1 person declined to respond), 
and political orientation (M=4.19, SD=1.34) were all measured in the same way as in Study 
2.  
Their UK counterparts were measured with English versions of collective narcissism 
(α=.86, M=3.04, SD=1.03), British national identification (α=.88, M=4.67, SD =.98), biased 
membership perceptions (α=.90, M=3.76, SD=1.30), voting preference in referendum 
regarding the United Kingdom leaving (42 participants for remaining in the UE coded as 0, 17 
for leaving EU coded as 1, 1 person declined to respond), and political orientation (M=3.62, 
SD=1.12). 
Results 
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Zero-order correlations. As in Studies 1- 2, national collective narcissism and 
national identification were significantly positively correlated with each other and with 
political orientation. Again, all of these variables were significantly positively related to the 




Biased membership perceptions. Similarly as in Study 2, we then examined 
predictors of the biased membership perception of Poland’s and UK’s membership using 
hierarchical regression models. Taking into account a relatively small sample we managed to 
recruit in that study, we were not able to test the measurement invariance, required for cross-
cultural comparisons. Thus, we analysed the support for leaving EU separately for those two 
samples2.  
Similarly as in Study 2, political orientation entered in Step 1 was a significant 
predictor of biased membership perceptions with right-wingers perceiving more costs than 
benefits of being part of the EU. Both age and gender were unrelated to biased membership 




                                                          
2 We also tested these effects within one model treating nationality as a moderator and 
did not find any significant moderation effects.  
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When the overlap between collective narcissism and national identification was 
adjusted for in Step 2, in both countries biased membership perceptions were significantly and 
positively predicted by collective narcissism, though not by national identification (among 
UK citizens national identification predicted biased membership perception negatively, but 
not significantly). 
Voting preferences in referenda. Again, as presented in Table 8, the results of 
logistic regression showed that in both countries collective narcissism, but not national 




Mediation models. Finally, we examined the mediation models using PROCESS 
macro with a bootstrapping procedure (with 10,000 resamples). As presented in Figure 2, both 
in Great Britain, Cox & Snell R2 = .51; p < .001; Nagelkerke R2 = .73; p < .001, and in 
Poland, Cox & Snell R2 = .38; p < .001; Nagelkerke R2 = .66; p < .001, biased membership 
perceptions were a significant mediator of the effect of collective narcissism on voting 





The results of the all studies converged to show that national collective narcissism was 
a strong positive predictor of a preference to leave the EU. We found this pattern in a 
representative Polish sample (Study 1), a sample of Polish youth (Study 2), and a sample of 
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employees professionally associated with international relations representing two different 
countries (Study 3). In Study 3, we observed a similar pattern both among citizens of the 
country which is leaving the EU (the UK) and the country which has not yet officially 
announced its intention to do so (Poland). The effects of national collective narcissism on 
Polexit and Brexit attitudes were mediated by perceiving the EU membership as having more 
costs than benefits (Studies 2 and 3). 
Crucially, we showed the opposite effects of national collective narcissism and 
national identification on readiness to vote Leave (Studies 1 and 2). Moreover, across all of 
the studies, we have found a significant effect of political orientation on voting with right-
wingers being more prone to vote Leave, both in Poland and in the UK. Importantly however, 
in all three studies the positive effects of national collective narcissism were significant over 
and above the effect of political orientation. Notably, the negative effect of secure national 
identification did not replicate in Study 3. This might be attributed to the smaller samples of 
British and Polish employees of the British Embassy in Poland that we managed to recruit in 
Study 3 than in Study 1 (involving a representative sample for Polish Internet users) and 
Study 2 (involving a sample of Polish youth). Thus, Study 3 might have been underpowered, 
and consequently we did not observe this relatively weaker effect (see Studies 1 and 2) as 
significant. 
 Our results are in line with past work on the national identification and Brexit attitudes 
(Golec de Zavala et al., 2017; Marchlewska et al., 2018). We extend past work by verifying 
the relationship between different forms of national identification and willingness to leave EU 
in different contexts (the UK and Poland), using representative (Polish) sample, and 
proposing that it is the biased perception of membership benefits that stands behind the effect 
of narcissistic national identification and support for leaving the EU. The current findings 
clarify the role national identity plays in predicting support for membership in multi-national 
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organisations. Previous work showed that collective narcissism, though not the national 
identification without the narcissistic component is associated with hostile intergroup attitudes 
(Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013). Extending this line of research, we have 
found that the collective narcissism, though not the national identification was associated with 
support for policies undermining close relations with other countries, thereby showing the 
potential ingroup-relevant consequences in the domain of international affairs (see also 
Cichocka, 2016).  
Implications and future directions 
These results may be interpreted within the broader framework of defensive versus 
secure ingroup identification. Defensive forms of identification such as collective narcissism 
are underlain by doubts whether the in-group is highly regarded and respected by others 
(Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). We found that defensive form of national identification, in 
contrast to the secure one, is associated with the biased perception of one’s own nation’s 
membership benefits within the multi-national organisations, and thereby with the greater 
readiness to leave them. Thus, defensiveness is associated with renouncing the benefits which 
are available to the ingroup, because other groups may benefit even more. Although not 
measured here, similar patterns could be predicted for other conceptualisations of in-group 
identification, to the extent they capture the excessive and defensive attachment to the group 
(such as nationalism or blind patriotism). The conceptualisation we used here allows, 
however, for testing these phenomena across different group contexts and thus may inspire 
future studies outside the immediate national context (e.g. organizational).  
In this work we suggest that collective narcissism is associated with biased, defensive 
interpretation of current international politics, which in turn encourages individuals to weaken 
intergroup ties. Our finding is in line with work showing that collective narcissists might view 
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their group as indispensable to the overarching EU identity (Guerra, Abakoumkin, Golec de 
Zavala, Sedikides, & Wildschut, 2019). In past research, in-group indispensability has been 
linked to negative attitude towards other outgroups (Ng Tseung-Wong & Verkuyten, 2010), 
which suggests that biased membership perceptions might not only weaken willingness to be 
part of the EU, but also harm relations with other EU members. Future work should explore 
these interesting questions.  
One limitation of the studies presented here is their correlational design. Indeed, one 
could argue that it is rather the biased perception of benefits stemming from EU membership 
that increases collective narcissism. In turn, this defensive response results in support for 
leaving supranational organizations. However, collective narcissism reflects deep-seated 
frustrations of individual needs (such as low feelings of self-worth; Golec de Zavala et al., 
2019 or low feelings of control over one’s life; Cichocka et al., 2018). It is thus less likely, 
that collective narcissism develops as a response to current political circumstances. Instead, it 
helps managing psychological needs of the individual and dealing with frustrations (cf., 
Fritsche et al., 2013), which nevertheless may be rooted in a more generalized sense of 
relative deprivation (Marchlewska et al., 2018). As such, it likely biases perception of those 
current political circumstances, thereby reflecting need management strategy. Future work 
should experimentally disentangle this mechanism. 
These results also show that similar social-psychological processes underpin support 
for EU integration versus disintegration in different societies. This suggests that biased 
membership perception standing behind citizens’ willingness to support policies undermining 
European integration, stems from defensive national identification. Yet, after controlling for 
the defensive, narcissistic component of national identification, strong secure identification 
tended to be negatively related to both dissatisfaction with EU membership and readiness to 
support exit. These processes operate over and above political ideology. This work thus 
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implies the ambivalent effects of fostering strong national or ethnic identification, a 
phenomenon so frequently observed in today’s political landscape. Mobilising nationalism is 
the factor implicated for the past fall of multi-national European countries (Hobsbawm, 
2012). Our social-psychological research suggests that defensive forms of national 
identification, such as national collective narcissism, may also be associated with 
dissatisfaction with multi-national organisations. Our work then suggests that appealing to 
unappreciated greatness of one’s nation and need for recognition may result in mobilising 
dissatisfaction with the effects of European integration and consequently in calling for exit. 
Still, mobilising secure national identification may lead to future integration of European 
countries. Thus, future work should examine how to differentially foster these two types of 
strong national commitment.  
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Figure 1. Mediation model representing associations between collective narcissism, biased 
perception of EU membership benefits and voting to leaving the EU (Study 2) 
  
 
exp B = 1.57 [1.00, 2.47] 







1=leave) exp B = -0.64 [-1.33, 0.06] 
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 Figure 2. Mediation models representing associations between collective narcissism, biased 
perception of the UK’s and Poland’s benefits from EU membership and voting to leaving the 
EU (Study 2) 
  
 
exp B = 2.35 [1.24, 4.45] 







1=leave) exp B = 0.93 [-0.26, 2.12] 
exp B = 3.77 [1.61, 8.83] 







1=leave) exp B = 1.01 [-0.30, 2.32] 
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Table 1 
Correlations between continuous variables with 95% confidence intervals and accompanying 
p values (Study 1) 
Variable 1 2 3 
1. Political orientation -   
2. National identification .25 [.18, .32] 
p<.001 
-  
3. Collective narcissism .39 [.32, .45] 
p<.001 
.56 [.50, .61] 
p<.001 
- 
3. Voting preference in a 
Polexit referendum 
.27 [.20, .34] 
p<.001 
.02 [-.06, .10]  
p =.629 
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Table 2 
Summary of hierarchical logistic regression analysis for voting Leave (Study 1) 
 Step 1 Step 2 
Variable expB[95% CI] p expB[95% CI] p 
Political orientation 1.88[1.55, 2.28] <.001 1.72[1.39, 2.12] <.001 
Gender 0.76[0.49, 1.19] .227 0.78[0.50, 1.23] .289 
Age 0.97[0.96, 0.99] <.001 0.98[0.96, 0.99] .002 
National 
identification 
  0.74[0.59, 0.94] .012 
Collective 
narcissism 
  1.49[1.18, 1.86] <.001 
-LL(D) 515.98 502.81 
H&L χ2 5.10 4.00 
Cox & Snell R2 .09 .11 
Nagelkerke R2 .15 .18 
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Table 3 
Correlations between continuous variables with 95% confidence intervals and accompanying 
p values (Study 2) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
1. Political orientation -    
2. National 
identification 
.28 [.14, .41] 
p<.001 
-   
3. Collective narcissism .13 [-.01, .27] 
p=.067 
.54 [.44, .63] 
p<.001 
-  
4. Biased membership 
perception  
.48 [.36, .58] 
p<.001 
.17 [.04, .29] 
p=.013 
.36 [.23, .47] 
p<.001 
- 
5. Voting preference in 
a Polexit referendum 
.37 [.24, .49] 
p<.001 
.03 [-.11, .16] 
p=.660 
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Table 4 
Summary of hierarchical regression analysis with the biased membership perception as criterion (Study 2) 
 Step 1 Step 2 
Variable B[95% CI] β (p) B[95% CI] β (p) 
Political orientation .40[0.28, 0.52] .42 (<.001) .40[0.28, 0.51] .42 (<.001) 
Gender -.62[-0.94, -0.30] -.25 (<.001) -.64[-0.94, -0.34] -.26 (<.001) 
Age -.04[-0.21, 0.14] -.03 (.678) < .001 [-0.16, 0.16] < .001 (.999) 
National identification   -.19[-0.35, -0.04] -.18 (.014) 
Collective narcissism   .47[0.31, 0.63] .40 (<.001) 
F F(3, 182) = 24.07; <.001 F(5, 180) = 23.48; <.001 
R2 .28 .40 
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Table 5 
Summary of hierarchical logistic regression analysis for voting to leaving the EU (Study 2) 
 Step 1 Step 2 
Variable expB[95% CI] p expB[95% CI] p 
Political 
orientation 
2.46[1.57, 3.85] <.001 3.16[1.81, 5.50] <.001 
Gender .25[0.09, 0.67] .006 .25[0.09, 0.68] .007 
Age 1.68[0.93, 3.02] .085 1.94[1.04, 3.63]  .037 
National 
identification 
  0.44[0.22, 0.87]  .019 
Collective 
narcissism 
  2.19[1.12, 4.25]  .021 
-LL(D) 108.27  108.88  
H&L χ2 9.38  14.49+  
Cox & Snell R2 .19  .22  
Nagelkerke R2 .34  .40  
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Table 6 
Correlations between continuous variables with 95% confidence intervals and accompanying 
p values (Study 3) 
Variable 1 2 3 4 
1. Political orientation -    
2. National identification .32 [.15, .46] 
p<.001 
-   









.26 [.09, .41] 
p<.01 
.40 [.25, .53] 
p<.001 
- 
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Table 7 
Summary of hierarchical regression analysis for biased perception of benefits from the UK’s and Poland’s membership as criteria (Study 3) 
 the UK Poland 
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 1 Step 2 
Variable B[95% CI] β (p) B[95% CI] β (p) B[95% CI] β (p) B[95% CI] β (p) 
Political 
orientation 
0.50[0.22, 0.78] .42 (<.001) 0.43[0.16, 0.70] .37 (.002) 0.59[0.41, 0.77] .64 (<.001) 0.39[0.20, 0.58] .42 (.001) 
Gender 0.51[-0.12, 1.14] .19 (.107) 0.44[-0.17, 1.04] .16 (.157) 0.11[-0.40, 0.63] .05 (.664) 0.13[-0.35, 0.60] .05 (.603) 
Age 0.02[-0.01, 0.05] .17 (.154) 0.02[-0.01, 0.05] .18 (.106) -0.01[-0.04, 0.01] -.10 (.337) -0.01[-0.03, 0.02] -.06 (.505) 
National 
identification 
  -0.22[-0.55, 0.11] -.16 (.183)   0.03[-0.26, 0.32] .03(.835) 
Collective 
narcissism 
  0.47[0.15, 0.78] .36 (.005)   0.42[0.17, 0.66] .41 (.001) 
F F(3, 53)=7.54; <.001 F(5, 51)=6.86; <.001 F(3,64)=17.55; <.001 F(5, 62)=17.19; <.001 
R2 .30 .40 .45 .58 
 




Summary of hierarchical logistic regression analysis for voting to leaving the EU by the UK and Poland (Study 3) 
 Support for Brexit  Support for Polexit 
 Step 1 Step 2  Step 1 Step 2 
Variable expB[95% CI] p expB[95% CI] p  expB[95% CI] p expB[95% CI] p 
Political orientation 2.69[1.34, 5.38] .005 3.32[1.38, 7.98] .007  2.93[1.12, 7.12]  .018 3.95[1.26, 12.39]  .019 
Gender .97[0.24, 3.83] .962 .59[0.13, 2.72] .499  2.10[0.17, 25.80] .562 1.49[0.11, 20.87] .766 
Age 1.06[1.00, 1.13] .064 1.07[1.00, 1.15] .045  .74[0.54, 1.00] .053 .70[0.46, 1.07] .096 
National 
identification 
  1.09[0.48, 2.50] .834    0.28[0.05, 1.45] .130 
Collective 
narcissism 
  2.60[1.12, 6.06] .027    3.11[0.91, 10.60] .071 
-LL(D) 52.84  45.20   28.90  24.45  
H&L χ2 7.68  8.10   1.73  .96  
Cox & Snell R2 .23  .33   .30  .34  
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Nagelkerke R2 .33  .47   .55  .64  
 
